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"To state the facts of the cases, the decision, and the reasoning of his
opinion will not show the overthrow of old doctrine.... Instead, it will
show the application of existing doctrines with wisdom and discretion;
an application that does not leave those doctrines wholly unaffected, but
one that carries on their evolution as is reasonably required by the new
facts before the court. When [he] is through, the law is not exactly as it
was before; but there has been no sudden shift or revolutionary
change."'
These are the words that Professor Arthur Corbin used to describe
the judicial work ofJustice Benjamin Cardozo, one of the preeminent
jurists of the twentieth century. Justice Cardozo was a superb judicial
craftsman in the grand tradition of the common law.2 Drawing on
accumulated experience,3 he effected reform through evolutionary
change in the law.4 Even at this point in his career-hopefully well
before his retirement-Chief Judge Edward Becker has established
himself as a reformer following a path strikingly similar to Cardozo's.
Judge Becker has been a reformer both as a district court judge
and as a court of appealsjudge. He has made his mark in many areas
of the law, one of which is evidence. It has been ajoy for us to teach
with, talk with, and learn from Judge Becker. He has not only
reformed the law of evidence, he has seen problems that others have
missed and provided answers to questions that had not been asked
before. While many judges tire of the routine of deciding cases and
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find that many legal issues become repetitive and uninteresting, Judge
Becker is virtually unique in his willingness to consider each case and
each issue as though it were his first. We see this clearly not only in
his opinions-where he has brought his incredible energy, insight,
and judgment to clarify and advance the law of evidence-but in his
other work as well.
I. JUDGE BECKER'S OPINIONS
As a district court judge, Judge Becker demonstrated an interest
and skill in handling evidence issues most clearly in the Japanese
Electronics Litigation, in which he filled much of a volume of the
Federal Supplement with three extraordinary evidence opinions.' Those
opinions were a sign that Judge Becker was willing, if not eager, to
tackle difficult evidentiary issues head on. He was not interested in
deferring decisions or avoiding them; he addressed more evidence
issues in those three opinions than, to our knowledge, any judge ever
has before or since.
The first opinion is one of the most comprehensive analyses of the
reliability problems attendant to public records. 6 Indeed, we know of
no other case in which a trial or appellate judge has been as
discerning and as persuasive in dealing with the hearsay exception for
public records set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) (C).
His second opinion addressed a number of evidentiary issues and
examined them more carefully than any other judge had . For
example, Judge Becker ruled that only admissible evidence can be
used to establish authenticity," a proposition that seems clearly correct
but rarely recognized in other judicial opinions. Another example is
Judge Becker's treatment of parent and subsidiary corporations. He
sets forth guidelines on when and whether a subsidiary's statements
r Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313 (E.D. Pa.
1980), affd in part, revd' in part sub nom. In reJapanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723
F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F.
Supp. 1190 (E.D. Pa. 1980), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. In rejapanese Elec. Prods.
Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125 (E.D. Pa. 1980), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. In re
Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nor.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
C Zenith Radio Corp., 505 F. Supp. 1125.
7 Zenith Radio Corp., 505 F. Supp. 1190.
8 Id. at 1218.
CHIEFJUDGE EDWARD R. BECKER
can be introduced against the parent as admissions.: Once again, the
analysis is as good or better than any before or since.
In his third opinion in the trilogy,'" Judge Becker demonstrated
how painstakingly he, as a trial judge, would screen expert opinions,
particularly the bases of expert testimony. The opinion is one of the
most sophisticated analyses of Federal Rule of Evidence 703 that has
been done to date." Judge Becker demonstrates so well his ability to
distinguish the wheat from the chaff-between useful economic
testimony that assists a trier of fact in understanding corporate
behavior and spurious economic testimony that purports to be able to
conclusively determine whether a conspiracy existed.
The third opinion in the Japanese Electronics Litigation required
Judge Becker to determine whether experts could rely upon data
which he had earlier excluded as unreliable. Judge Becker dealt
deftly with the interface between hearsay and expert testimony and
noted the close relationship between the hearsay exception for
opinions contained in trustworthy public reports (Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(8) (C)) and the standards regulating expert opinion in
Article VII of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Implicit in the
trustworthiness requirement in both sets of rules is the right of the
opponent to attack the basis of the expert's opinion. Judge Becker
then conducted a detailed, in-depth analysis of the reliability of
various hearsay passages relied upon by the experts. That analysis led
him to exclude several of the passages in the proffered expert reports.
Although the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit later rejected
Judge Becker's construction of Rule 703,12 Judge Becker would be
vindicated. Ironically, the Third Circuit criticized Judge Becker's
analysis because, in effect, he had assumed the gatekeeper role that
the Supreme Court would later mandate. The Court of Appeals
asserted that "[t]he proper inquiry is not what the court deems
reliable, but what experts in the relevant discipline deem it to be."':
Ten years later, the Supreme Court would expressly direct district
court judges to inquire into the reliability of proffered scientific
Id. at 1247.
Zenith Radio Corp., 505 F. Supp. 1313.
Rule 703 permits an expert to rely on inadmissible evidence, so long as it is the
type of information that is reasonably relied upon by other experts in the field. FED. R.
EVD. 703.
N, In reJapanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 275-79 (3d Cir. 1983),
tv'd szb norn. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
' Id. at 276.
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testimony and to reject the notion that the dispositive question is
"what experts in the relevant discipline deem" reliable.
As it turns out, the Japanese Electronics Litigation opinions were
only the first chapter in Judge Becker's substantial contributions to
the law regarding expert testimony. No jurist has had more impact or
made a more positive contribution than he has to an understanding
of the judicial role in assessing the admissibility of expert opinions. In
United States v. Downing,4 Judge Becker anticipated the Supreme
Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,''
holding that the traditional, general acceptance test for the
admissibility of scientific testimony set forth in the 1923 decision of
Frye v. United States6 was no longer controlling in federal practice.
The Downing opinion is a masterful interpretation of Federal Rule of
Evidence 702, the main rule governing the admissibility of expert
testimony. That rule essentially provides that expert testimony is
admissible whenever it would be helpful to the fact-finder. In the
following important passage from Downing, Judge Becker interpreted
the Rule 702 standard of "helpfulness" as distinct from the traditional
standard of "general acceptance":
Although we believe that "helpfulness" necessarily implies a quantum of
reliability beyond that required to meet a standard of bare logical
relevance. ... it also seems clear to us that some scientific evidence can
assist the trier of fact in reaching an accurate determination of facts in
issue even though the principles underlying the evidence have not
become "generally accepted" in the field to which they belong.
Moreover, we can assume that the drafters of the Federal Rules of
Evidence were aware that the Frye test Aas ajudicial creation, and we find
nothing in the language of the rules to suggest a disapproval of such
interstitial judicial rulemaking. Therefore, although the codification of
the rules of evidence may counsel in favor of a re-examination of the
general acceptance standard, on balance we conclude that the Federal
Rules of Evidence neither incorporate nor repudiate it. 8
Downing surveyed case law and literature, assessed it with a keen
eye, and arrived at a sensible approach that, like Daubert, incorporated
the general acceptance analysis into a more refined, flexible, and
multifaceted test for reviewing expert testimony.
Judge Becker described the proper approach to the admissibility
14 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
15 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
16 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
17 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587-89.
is 753 F.2d at 1235.
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of expert testimony in the following words:
The language of Fed. R. Evid. 702, the spirit of the Federal Rules of
Evidence in general, and the experience with the Frye test suggest the
appropriateness of a more flexible approach to the admissibility of novel
scientific evidence. In our view, Rule 702 requires that a district court
ruling upon the admission of (novel) scientific evidence, i.e., evidence
whose scientific fundaments are not suitable candidates for judicial
notice, conduct a preliminary inquiry focusing on (1) the soundness and
reliability of the process or technique used in generating the evidence,
(2) the possibility that admitting the evidence would overwhelm,
confuse, or mislead the jury, and (3) the proffered connection between
the scientific research or test result to be presented, and particular
disputed factual issues in the case.19
This language was clear, cogent, and convincing enough that
Justice Blackmun borrowed extensively from Downing in his Daubert
opinion."' As we look back on Downing, we cannot help but think that
the paragraph quoted above sets forth a clearer test for scientific
evidence and provides more guidance for trial judges than does
Daubed. Downing is typical of a Becker evidence opinion. It is at once
scholarly and practical. It is complete and careful, thoroughly
researched and heavily footnoted, and it assists trial judges to
understand precisely what is expected of them.
The Supreme Court decided Daubert eight years after Downing.
The Court found that the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence
in 1975 had impliedly overturned the traditional "general acceptance"
requirement. The Court pointed out that Federal Rule of Evidence
402 states, "'[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress,
by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority.''
The Court noted that the exceptive clause makes no mention of
case or decisional law.22 The general acceptance test was a creature of
case law. The Court added that it could find no language in the
statutory text of the Federal Rules that could reasonably be
interpreted to codify the general acceptance standard." That
omission had the effect of superseding the traditional general
acceptance standard, since "'[iln principle, under the Federal Rules
Id. at 1237 (foomote omitted).
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591,594 & n.12.
" Id. at 587 (quoting FED. R. EvID. 402).
Id. at 587-88.
" Id. at 588.
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[of Evidence] no common law of evidence remains.'
2
However, writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun was quick to
add that the abolition of the general acceptance requirement did not
mean that "the Rules themselves place no limits on the admissibility of
purportedly scientific evidence. ' '25  Quite to the contrary, Justice
Blackmun emphasized that under the Federal Rules the trial judge
has a vital "gatekeeping ", 6 or "screening,2 7 role to play. Justice
Blackmun derived that role from the language of Federal Rule of
Evidence 702. That statute refers to "scientific ... knowledge."'
Daubert asserted that the trial judge's task is to ensure that proffered
testimony "both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the
task at hand., 29  Justice Blackmun wrote that the "overarching"
concern "is the scientific validity-and thus the evidentiary relevance
and reliability-of the principles that underlie a proposed
submission." 30 He explained that the proponent must demonstrate
the reliability of the proffered testimony by establishing that the
underlying hypothesis has been validated by appropriate scientific
methodology.3' Justice Blackmun then listed some of the factors that
trial judges should consider in evaluating the sufficiency of the
proponent's showing of reliability. For example, he mentions the
known or potential error rate disclosed in the research.32
Justice Blackmun gets the credit for authoring the Daubert
opinion, but the analysis he chose to embrace bears the unmistakable
imprint of Judge Becker. When Judge Becker rejected the general
acceptance test "as an independent controlling standard of
admissibility,"3 3 he based that rejection in part on his construction of
the pertinent Federal Rules of Evidence, including the very language
in Rule 4 0 2 3 that Justice Blackmun would later quote in Daubert.' In
Downing, Judge Becker endorsed the view that under Rule 702,
24 Id. (quoting EdwardJ. Clear,, Preliminay Notes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57
NEB. L. REv. 908, 915 (1978)).
25 Id. at 589.
26 Id. at 589 n.7, 597.
27 Id. at 589,596.
28 FED. R. EVID. 702.
29 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
3 Id. at 594-95.
31 Id. at 592-95.
32 Id. at 594.
33 United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985).
"4 Id. at 1233-35.
35 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.
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"reliability" is "a critical element of admissibility."36 Not only did
Justice Blackmun reach the same conclusion, but he adopted the
Becker view that in assessing the reliability of proposed scientific
testimony, the trial judge should focus on whether the witness had
employed sound scientific methodology to validate the underlying
hypothesis.2' Justice Blackmun also followed the lead ofJudge Becker
in his discussion of factors that a trial court might take into account in
assessing the reliability of scientific expert testimony-for example,
suggesting that the error rate of a technique should be considered by
the trial judge.' Justice Blackmun essentially acknowledged the
Becker contribution to Daubert in his several citations to Downin and
recognized that Judge Becker had anticipated and "aptly described"
some of the prescriptions mandated by Daubert.4"
After Daubert, it was Judge Becker more than any other judge who
explained what Daubert required; it was Judge Becker who provided
guidance to trial judges as to how to perform their gatekeeping role.
In hi re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation,4" Judge Becker reviewed, in
light of Daubet, a grant of summary judgment in a case alleging
damages from exposure to PCBs. Judge Becker engaged in an
extensive and incisive analysis of Daubert's effect on the admissibility of
scientific expert testimony. Among the more important points Judge
Becker made about the gatekeeping function were these:
(1) Because ajudge at an in limine hearing must make findings of
fact on complex scientific issues, and because the in limine ruling is
often dispositive, "it is important that each side have an opportunity to
depose the other side's experts in order to develop strong critiques
and defenses of their experts' methodologies.""2
(2) Since the question of reliability is an admissibility requirement
governed by Rule 104(a), a proponent must do more than simply
make a prima facie case on reliability. Rather, the proponent must
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the testimony is
reliable (although the "evidentiary requirement of reliability is lower
than the merits standard of correctness") .4
"- Downing, 753 F.2d at 1238.
,7 Id. at 1237-39.
Id. at 1239.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591,594.
Id. at 591.
35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994).
4-' Id. at 739.
3 Id. at 744.
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(3) After Daubert, any distinction between methodology and its
application is no longer viable. Daubert must be read as meaning that
"any step that renders the analysis unreliable ... renders the expert's
testimony inadmissible. This is true whether the step completely
changes a reliable methodology or merely misapplies that
methodology."
44
(4) Because Daubert held that Rule 702 was the "primary locus of
[a court's] gatekeeping role," the use of Rule 403 to exclude expert
testimony should be left for the rare case. For exclusion to be
warranted under Rule 403, "there must be something particularly
confusing about the scientific evidence at issue-something other
than the general complexity of scientific evidence.
45
The guidance provided by Paoli has been important not only to
trial judges in the Third Circuit, but also to judges elsewhere because
it is the clearest available statement of what Daubert means.
More recently, Judge Becker provided additional guidance to trial
judges on the meaning of Daubert in Elcock v. Kmart Corp.46 The
opinion addresses the tricky, neglected subject of whether a trial
judge can consider an expert's credibility when performing the
gatekeeping function. Judge Becker reasoned cogently that the
particular expert's credibility as a witness must be separated from the
reliability of the expert's methods. A trial judge who excludes an
expert's testimony because she believes the expert to be a liar is
operating not as a gatekeeper, but rather as a juror. Judge Becker in
Elcock also had important things to say about Daubert's application to
nonscientific expert testimony-a discussion critical for judges,
scholars, and lawyers in light of the Supreme Court's extension of the
trial court's gatekeeping function to nonscientific experts in Kumho
Tire Co. V. CarmichaeL
47
Judge Becker has also sounded a much-needed note of caution to
trial judges who might be tempted to apply Daubert with too heavy a
hand. In the years immediately after Daubert, some reported cases
seemed to hold that an expert's testimony had to be perfect before it
44 Id. at 745 (emphasis omitted).
d* Id. at 747-48. Rule 403 gives the trial judge discretion to exclude relevant
evidence if its probative value is "substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R.
EvID. 403.
46 233 F.3d 734 (3d Cir. 2000).
47 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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could be admitted. 4" Trial judges occasionally took on the role of
meta-expert, strictly scrutinizing an expert's research and method-
ology--as if the judge were a scientist reviewing a dissertation rather
than a judge reviewing proffered expert testimony. These cases
threatened to make the trial judge a superjuror, excluding expert
testimony (and thereafter dismissing the case on summary judgment)
simply because the trial judge found some minor imperfection in the.
expert's basis or methodology. Judge Becker's thoughtful and
influential opinion in Heller v. Shaw Industries, Inc. counseled against
this too-aggressive use of the gatekeeping function.! This was no
small feat because the court in Heller ultimately affirmed the trial
court's exclusion of the plaintiffs expert testimony. But in doing so,
Judge Becker urged a cautious approach that he found necessary to
protect the plaintiff's right to a jury's consideration of reasonably
reliable expert testimony. Judge Becker emphasized that "an expert
opinion must be based on reliable methodology and must reliably
flow from that methodology and the facts at issue-but it need not be
so persuasive as to meet a party's burden of proof or even necessarily
its burden of production." " He noted that it should be permissible
for an expert to rely at least in part on the temporal relationship
between exposure and injury in concluding that the exposure caused
the injury. He also ruled (despite rigid case law to the contrary) that a
doctor may be permitted to testify on the basis of a properly
conducted differential diagnosis. Judge Becker stressed that an expert
is not required to rule out all possible alternative causes before
opining on causation. He also rejected an absolute requirement that
a scientific expert must rely on extensive scientific research and
studies. As Judge Becker put it so eloquently:
Given the liberal thrust of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the flexible
nature of the Daubert inquiry, and the proper roles of the judge and the
jury in evaluating the ultimate credibility of an expert's opinion, we do
not believe that a medical expert must always cite published studies on
general causation in order to reliably conclude that a particular object
caused a particular illness.... To so hold would doom from the outset
all cases in which the state of research on the specific ailment or on the
alleged causal agent was in its early stages, and would effectively
resurrect a Fhe-like bright-line standard, not by requiring that a
4' Se Daniel J. Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 32 GA. L. REV. 699 (1998) (rejecting
Daubeit s five factor test as too amorphous to be helpful in regulating expert testimony,
but noting that Daubert's test does provide a useful way to think about such testimony).
I'167 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1999).
Id. at 152.
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methodology be "generally accepted," but by excluding expert testimony
not backed by published (and presumably peer-reviewed) studies. We
have held that the reliability analysis applies to all aspects of an expert's
testimony: the methodology, the facts underlying the expert's opinion,
the link between the facts and the conclusion, et alia. However, not only
must each stage of the expert's testimony be reliable, but each stage
must be evaluated practically and flexibly without bright-line
exclusionary (or inclusionary) rules.5 1
This passage from Heller is a wise reminder that the goal of
evidence "reform" is not to establish a system of admitting only
"perfect" evidence. Rather, the cause of evidence reform is advanced
by sensible rules that guarantee fairness among adversaries and
reasoned determination by the factfinder.
There are far too many Becker opinions on evidence for us to
discuss in the space we are allocated. We have focused on expert
testimony because his impact has been so obvious and his attention to
the subject has occupied him for most of his career on the bench. It is
evident that Judge Becker made a major contribution to shaping the
judicial gatekeeping role, which the Daubert Court endorsed. No
single opinion by Judge Becker worked a revolution, but in the
tradition of Justice Cardozo, Judge Becker's opinions "carrie [d] on
the[] evolution" of the standards for admitting expert evidence.
II. JUDGE BECKER'S SCHOLARSHIP
While Judge Becker's judicial opinions set the stage for the
Daubert decision, in turn, the Daubert decision was in a line of authority
that inspired one of his most important pieces of scholarship. In a
line of cases dating back to 1984,' 2 a majority of the Supreme Court
justices made it reasonably clear that they subscribed to a moderate
school of the textualist approach to statutory interpretation."i In
particular, as in Daubert, the majority indicated that to be enforceable,
an exclusionary rule of evidence had to be codified. Although the
general acceptance test dated back seventy years" and had been the
overwhelming majority view,5' the Daubert Court pronounced it dead
11 Id. at 155.
52 United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984); see also Boujaily v. United States, 483
U.S. 171 (1987).
53 Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Brief Defense of the Supreme Court's Approach to the
Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 27 IND. L. REV. 267, 268-71 (1993).
.4 Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
55 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIc EVIDENCE: THE LAXv AND
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because it had not been incorporated in the statutory text of the
Federal Rules. The federal courts no longer enjoyed the common-law
power to promulgate uncodified exclusionary rules.5 Again, Rule 402
declares that all logically relevant evidence is admissible unless the
court can exclude it on the basis of specified types of law, and case or
decisional law is conspicuously absent from the list of types of law.
A number of commentators took the Court to task for this
approach to statutory interpretation. In some cases, the
commentators criticized the specific evidentiary rulings, which the
Court issued as a result of this approach.57  In other cases,
commentators expressed the concern that the approach would
impede the ongoing reform of evidence law.58 If an exclusionary rule
had to be codified to be enforceable, congressional intervention
would be necessary even when it became patent that the rule was
desirable or even necessary. Since Congress has such a busy agenda,
there was a grave risk that deficiencies in federal evidence law would
go uncorrected.
At this point, it was Judge Becker who put two and two together.
He realized that the best solution was to reestablish the Advisory
Committee on Federal Rules of Evidence. That committee had
drafted the version of the Rules that had been approved by the
Supreme Court and was later revised and enacted by Congress. The
Committee, however, had been permitted to disband after the
enactment of the Rules. In an often-cited article, Judge Becker
proposed the reestablishment of the committee.5 Early in the article,
Judge Becker and his co-author, Professor Orenstein, pointed to the
trend in the Supreme Court decisions "toward a 'plain meaning'
interpretation of the Federal Rules" of Evidence.6 Judge Becker
appreciated that the trend might stultify the reform movement in
evidence law. If a problem arose under the Federal Rules but
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY §§ 1-2.3 (1997).
EdwardJ. Im.nkelried, Miether the Federal Rules of Evidence Should Be Conceived as
a Peypetual hid,- Code: Blindness Is Morse Than Myopia, 40 &M. N,ARY L. REV. 1595
(1999).
' Glen Weissenberger, The Supreme Court and the Interpretation of the Federal Rules of
Evidence 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1307 (1992).
Randolph N.Jonakait, The Supreme Court, Plain Meaning and the Changed Rules of
Evidnce, 68 TEX. L. REv. 745 (1990).
Edward R. Becker & Axviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen
Iar n-Th, EfJert of 'Plain Meaning'Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisory Committee on the
Rules of Evidenr, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
857 (1992).
Id. at 864.
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Congress lacked "sufficient institutional interest ... to pursue the
job"63 of remedying the problem, the problem might fester for years.
As a realist, Judge Becker observed that although "sensational cases"
might "capture Congress' attention," "Congress is too busy to focus on
day-to-day monitoring" of evidentiary norms.62 Judge Becker argued
that an advisory committee was a better vehicle for promoting the
cause of evidence reform because it could engage in "responsible
monitoring and selective revision" of the Federal Rules.63
Judge Becker's article was instrumental in persuading the United
States Judicial Conference to reestablish an advisory committee
devoted to the Federal Rules of Evidence." In 1993-the year
immediately after the release of Judge Becker's article-the United
States Judicial Conference appointed a new Advisory Committee on
the Federal Rules of Evidence. 5
In short, while Judge Becker's opinions have resulted in the
reform of individual evidentiary doctrines, perhaps even more
importantly, he played a leading role in creating the general
procedural mechanisms ensuring that it will be feasible to reform
evidence law in the future without going to the length of entreating
congressional intervention.
III. JUDGE BECKER AND THE ADVISORY CoMMITTEE
Judge Becker's influence on the rulemaking process did not end
with his groundbreaking article. He has been a constant source of
support and guidance for the Advisory Committee. The Reporter to
the Advisory Committee has often sought his advice on ways to
approach difficult evidentiary questions, as well as the perils and
politics of the rulemaking process.6 For example, on one occasion,
the Reporter called Judge Becker for his views on how Federal Rule of
Evidence 615, providing for sequestration of witnesses, could be
squared with congressional legislation granting crime victims the right
to attend a trial. Judge Becker directed the Reporter to "take a step
61 Id. at 913.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 914.
64 1 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 6-7 (7th
ed. 1998).
5 Id. at 7; 21 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHA,JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RuLES OF EVIDENCE § 5008 (Supp. 2000).
66 One of the authors of this tribute currently serves as Reporter to the Advisory
Committee on Evidence Rules.
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back and figure out the policy and history of sequestration. For that,
of course, you need to go back to the Bible, the story of Susanna and
the Elders. As you know, your namesake there did a great job."67
Luckily, the Reporter did not have to betray his ignorance because
Judge Becker terminated the conversation at that point.8 The
Reporter dusted off a Bible, and sure enough the story of Susanna and
the Elders provided a perfect backdrop for an understanding of the
policies supporting sequestration. Daniel sequestered the Elders and
the), testified inconsistently at "trial," making it easy for Daniel to
assess the credibility of conflicting witnesses. Judge Becker's biblical
allusion helped the Advisory Committee prepare its position on the
pending victim's rights legislation.
Judge Becker's opinions have also had a profound impact on the
work of the Advisory Committee and its efforts at evidence reform.
His classic opinions on expert testimony, discussed above, provided
the structure for the amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 that
went into effect on December 1, 2000." That amendment is intended
to codify the Supreme Court's decisions in Daubert and Kumho, but it
does so by clarifing that those cases mandate a step-by-step approach
to gatekeeping. Under the amendment, the trial judge must find that
the expert has a sufficient basis for the opinion, that the expert is
using a reliable method, and that the method has been applied
reliably to the facts of the case. All of these criteria are derived from
Judge Becker's post-Daubert opinions, most notably Paoli. The
Committee Note to the amended Rule 702 relies on Judge Becker's
opinions at five separate points. Paoli is used to support the important
proposition that "'any step that renders the analysis un-
reliable.., renders the expert's testimony inadmissible. This is true
whether the step completely changes a reliable methodolog or merely misapplies
,,7 The Reporter's first name is Daniel.
- The text above cannot convey the speed with which this information was
rendered by Judge Becker and the telephone conversation terminated. Anyone who
has had a telephone conversation with Judge Becker knows what we are talking about;
Judge Becker is the master of getting to the point and moving on. He has a lot to do.
... The amended Rule 702 reads as follows:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if(1) the testimony is
based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the
facts of the case.
FEn. R. EVD. 702 (emphasis added).
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that methodology."' 7  The so-called "application" factor in the
amendment is lifted from Judge Becker's analysis in Paoli. And Heller
is relied on in the Committee Note to caution against an excessive use
of the gatekeeper function. The references to Heller were added to
the Committee Note after the public comment period and are
particularly important because they helped to allay concerns
expressed by plaintiffs' lawyers that the amendment would deprive
plaintiffs with legitimate claims of their right to jury trial.
Judge Becker's opinion in Asplundh Manufacturing Division v.
Benton Harbor Engineering was the motivating force for the
amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 701 that took effect on
December 1, 2000.7 In Asplundh, a party proffered a lay witness to
give an opinion about the cause of a crane collapse. The witness was
testifying on the basis of technical knowledge. The opponent
challenged the testimony under Daubert, but the proponent argued
that Daubert was inapplicable to lay witness testimony. Judge Becker
presented a thorough and trenchant discussion of the case law on
Rule 701 (the rule governing lay opinion testimony) and determined
that courts applying that rule had blurred the line between expert and
lay witnesses by permitting lay witnesses to testify on the basis of
technical and specialized knowledge. This expansion of Rule 701 was
problematic because it provided an incentive for parties to try to
escape the strictures on expert testimony (specifically the Danhert
requirements) by proffering shoddy experts as "lay" witnesses. Judge
Becker concluded that the "spirit" of Daubert would be violated by
such a subterfuge; therefore, a "lay" witness who testified on the basis
of scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge must satisfy the
Daubert requirements. Judge Becker "invited" the Advisory Committee
to consider whether Rule 701 should be amended to require that
testimony based on scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge is to be admitted under Rule 702 or not at all. Such an
amendment was completely consistent with the cause of proper
70 Id. committee note (quoting Paoli, 35 F.3d at 745) (omission in original).
71 57 F.3d 1190 (3d Cir. 1995).
n The amended Rule 701 provides as follows:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form
of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are
(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in
issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within
the scope of Rule 702.
FED. R. EvID. 701 (emphasis added).
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evidence reform because it would close a gaping loophole in the Rules
and prevent sharp practice.
The Advisory Committee accepted Judge Becker's invitation and
crafted an amendment that essentially codified his opinion in
Asplundh. Not surprisingly, Judge Becker's opinion was the
foundation for the Committee Note to the amendment as well. Most
critically, the Committee Note quotes Judge Becker for the
proposition that the amendment is not intended to affect the
prototypical example[s] of the type of evidence contemplated by the
adoption of Rule 701 relat[ing] to the appearance of persons or things,
identity, the manner of conduct, competency of a person, degrees of
light or darkness, sound, size, weight, distance, and an endless number
of items that cannot be described factually in words apart from
inferences.'
Judge Becker also had a critical impact on the rulemaking process
itself. In his role as Chair of the Executive Committee of the Judicial
Conference, Judge Becker provided essential support for the Advisory
Committee's package of amendments to the Federal Rules of
Evidence. In particular, Judge Becker deftly deflected the attack by
the Department of Justice on the amendment to Rule 701. The
Department took the position that under the amendment it would
have to qualify virtually all of its witnesses as experts. Judge Becker
noted that the amendment was not nearly that dramatic-all it stated
was that a party could not evade the constraints on expert testimony
by simply labeling its witness as a "lay" witness. Judge Becker's
measured responses to the overheated arguments of the Department
of Justice helped save the amendment at a critical juncture in the
rulemaking process.
IV. JUDGE BECKER'S LECTURES
Judge Becker has contributed to the cause of law reform on still
another front. Despite his busy judicial schedule, he frequently
appears as a speaker at continuing judicial and legal education
programs. Each of us has been privileged to hear him speak and to
teach side by side with him. Two of us recall vividly the power of his
plenary address at an American Association of Law Schools Evidence
Conference at the University of Iowa in 1991. 74 It was clear to us and
to all who attended that Judge Becker, despite his busy schedule,
'Aspiundh, 57 F.3d at 1196.
Sir Becker & Orenstein, supra note 59.
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makes time to stay abreast of the new scholarly literature in the
evidence field. Moreover, it was clear to every listener that he has an
abiding commitment to the reform of evidence law and a receptivity
to new ideas. Every scholar in the audience came away energized
because he or she realized that here was a leading jurist who was not
only willing, but even eager, to entertain law reform proposals.
V. JUDGE BECKER'S COMMITMENT TO LAWYERS,JUDGES,
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW
There is one other contribution that Judge Becker has made to
the law of evidence as well as to the legal profession. He has
demonstrated both as a district judge and as a court of appeals judge
how much he values the law and the lawyers and judges who
implement it. He treats each case as though it were the most
important and interesting case he has seen to date. So many lawyers
and judges become such creatures of habit that they resist change
even when it would advance the law and promote justice. Judge
Becker acknowledges and respects precedent, but his primary
allegiance is to improving the law and providing the best possible
justice for all. These higher goals inspire Judge Becker to view
precedent through the ever-changing lens of experience. He has a
profound regard for well-settled propositions of law, but he realizes
that in the final analysis they are the means to the end of reaching a
fair decision and promoting justice.
CONCLUSION
Judge Becker has already concluded thirty years of superb service
to the American judiciary. As the tone of our remarks suggests, we
sincerely hope that he remains on the bench for years to come.
However, even at this point in his judicial career, he has left his mark
on American evidence law. Like Justice Cardozo's treatment of
contract doctrine, Judge Becker's analyses of evidentiary issues have
carried on the evolution of evidence doctrine in a sensible,
progressive spirit. Like Justice Cardozo, he has brought "wisdom and
discretion" to the resolution of those issues.75 Even more importantly,
he has taken the lead in devising procedural mechanisms to prevent
the stagnation or obsolescence of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Judge Becker has made a signal contribution to keeping the reformist
75 FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 81.
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spirit alive in evidence law.
We each have taught evidence for many years. At times, we know
that we fall into the trap of thinking we have all the answers. It is the
opinions of Ed Becker that remind us that we have not begun to think
of all the questions and that sometimes our answers are old and tired
and must be rethought.
Judge Becker is a hero to us. He treats the subject of evidence
with a reverence and respect that is unique in our experience. We
salute him for all he has already done and look forward to his further
efforts to reform the law of evidence for a new century.
* * * * * *
